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Abstract
Standard game-theoretic formulations for settings like contextual pricing and security games
assume that agents act in accordance with a specific behavioral model. In practice however,
some agents may not prescribe to the dominant behavioral model or may act in ways that are
arbitrarily inconsistent. Existing algorithms heavily depend on the model being (approximately)
accurate for all agents and have poor performance in the presence of even a few such arbitrarily
irrational agents. How do we design learning algorithms that are robust to the presence of
arbitrarily irrational agents?
We address this question for a number of canonical game-theoretic applications by design-
ing a robust algorithm for the fundamental problem of multidimensional binary search. The
performance of our algorithm degrades gracefully with the number of corrupted rounds, which
correspond to irrational agents and need not be known in advance. As binary search is the
key primitive in algorithms for contextual pricing, Stackelberg Security Games, and other game-
theoretic applications, we immediately obtain robust algorithms for these settings.
Our techniques draw inspiration from learning theory, game theory, high-dimensional geom-
etry, and convex analysis, and may be of independent algorithmic interest.
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1 Introduction
A common assumption in game-theoretic settings such as pricing and Stackelberg Security Games
(SSGs) is that agents best-respond according to some (parametric) behavioral model. While models
studied in the literature vary in complexity, no behavioral assumption perfectly captures reality,
and, in practice, algorithms will interact with agents that deviate from the assumed model. As the
behavioral model is the underlying theory of rationality, such deviations seem arbitrarily irrational
from the perspective of the algorithm. Unfortunately, existing algorithms for learning in strategic
settings rely heavily on behavioral assumptions and can fail dramatically even with a few irrational
agents. This naturally leads to the following question:
How do we design learning algorithms that are robust to the presence of arbitrarily irrational
agents?
We tackle this question by focusing on binary search, a key ingredient for several online game-
theoretic settings, including contextual pricing. In the standard formulation for contextual pricing,
the behavioral model is governed by an unknown parameter θ⋆ ∈ Rd, which determines the signif-
icance of each product feature: A customer purchases an item with features υ at price p if and
only if 〈θ⋆,υ〉 ≥ p. When customers behave consistently according to this model, the seller can use
multidimensional binary search techniques to learn the underlying parameter θ⋆ and subsequently
make pricing decisions that maximize revenue [CLPL19, LPLV18].
In practice, this behavioral assumption may hold for most customers, but some customers may
not make purchase decisions according to θ⋆. For example, some customers may make impulsive
purchase decisions or otherwise exhibit irrational behavior that is not captured by the parametric
model. Unfortunately, algorithms based on binary search techniques can completely break down in
the presence of such irrational customers; in the sequel we provide examples where even a single
irrational agent leads to vacuous performance guarantees.
In this paper, we design algorithms that are robust to violations of the behavioral model, by
viewing irrational agents as completely adversarial. We present a robust multidimensional binary
search algorithm that degrades gracefully in the presence of adversarial corruptions, with no as-
sumptions on how many corrupted agents might appear. Since binary search is a fundamental
algorithmic primitive for learning in strategic settings even beyond contextual pricing, our results
offer a methodology to create mechanisms that are robust to the presence of an unknown number
of irrational agents.
1.1 Our contributions
We make contributions on three fronts. First, from a modeling perspective, we provide a framework
to view arbitrarily irrational agents via the lens of adversarial corruptions. We study settings in
which the learner interacts with a sequence of agents, where most agents follow a (parametric) be-
havioral model, but an unknown number of agents act completely adversarially. We seek algorithms
with performance guarantees that degrade gracefully with the number of adversarial agents. This
perspective contrasts with previous work assuming bounded or stochastic deviations from the behav-
ioral model, which provides a complementary form of robustness, but does not capture some kinds
of model violations that may occur in practice. Our approach provides a general framework for
designing mechanisms that are robust to arbitrarily irrational agents, and we hope our formulation
will prove useful in other game-theoretic settings.
Second, our main algorithmic contribution is a corruption-robust multidimensional binary search
procedure (Algorithm 4). We measure performance via a notion of regret, and we prove (Theo-
rem 4.1) that the algorithm has regret O(d3(C + log T ) log(T ) log(d/ε)) where C is the number of
1
corrupted rounds, d is the dimensionality of the problem, T is the total number of rounds, and ε is
the accuracy to which we want to localize the ground truth parameter (for the uncorrupted rounds).
This guarantee is similar to previous results for non-robust algorithms [LPLV18], with a favorable
nearly-linear scaling with C, demonstrating a minimal overhead for robustness. On the computa-
tional side, the algorithm runs in quasipolynomial time. In addition, it is robust to an unknown
amount corruption, so the parameter C above need not be known a priori. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the algorithm or closely related ideas apply to different dynamic pricing formu-
lations as well as Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs), so we seamlessly obtain corruption-robust
algorithms and guarantees for these settings as corollaries of our main results.
Our third contribution is technical: our analysis for the corruption-robust multidimensional
binary search algorithm requires elegant technical innovations and machinery from several mathe-
matical disciplines. The core technical argument involves finding a hyperplane passing through the
centroid of a given convex body, so that a certain non-convex region is contained entirely in one
halfspace. To do so, the algorithm and proof use classical techniques from learning theory (the per-
ceptron analysis), ideas from convex analysis (Carathéodory’s theorem), as well as arguments from
high dimensional geometry (Grünbaum’s theorem and volumes of spherical caps). Elsewhere we
also use modern techniques from learning theory, specifically we extend a multi-layering technique
from the stochastic bandit literature [LMPL18] to continuous decision spaces.
1.2 Related work
Our work is squarely situated at the interface of the areas of learning in the presence of strategic
agents and online learning robust to adversarial corruptions.
Learning in the presence of strategic agents. A recent thread of research stemming from the
Algorithmic Game Theory and Machine Learning communities considers settings where a learner
interacts with a number of strategic agents and wishes to obtain pristine data from them, despite
their incentives to game her. Among these problems, our work is most closely related to dynamic
pricing, which was originally introduced as a single-dimensional problem by Kleinberg and Leighton
[KL03]. Subsequently, Amin et al. [ARS14] studied the problem in its multidimensional form,
but focused on iid contexts. Cohen et al. [CLPL19] studied1 contextual pricing with adversarial
contexts and subsequently, Lobel et al. [LPLV18] and Paes Leme and Schneider [PLS18] obtained
improved regret guarantees. Mao et al. [MPLS18] studied a variant of the standard contextual
pricing problem, where the buyers have utilities that are no longer linear in the contexts, but are
instead Lipschitz. Recently, Shah et al. [SJB19] also studied the problem of contextual dynamic
pricing having under semi-parametric model assumptions. Our work is also related to the works
studying learning of optimal commitment strategies in SSGs. It is nearly impossible to survey the
vast literature in SSGs (see e.g., [SFA+18] for a survey). Closer to our work, Blum et al. [BHP14]
study the sample complexity of learning the optimal strategy to commit to, when the utility of the
attacker is unknown, and more recently, Peng et al. [PSTZ19] obtained strengthened guarantees.
The fundamental difference between these works and ours is that we focus on cases where we might
encounter a number of irrational agents, for which all previous works fail to provide meaningful
guarantees. That said, these works (e.g., [LPLV18], [PSTZ19], [MPLS18]) serve as starting points
for our algorithms.
1Cohen et al. also extended their algorithm to a noise-tolerant variant, for stochastic noise models. Models of
stochastic noise have also been considered for the problem of binary search in graphs in [EZKS16].
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Online learning robust to adversarial corruptions. Lykouris et al. [LMPL18] introduced a
variant of the standard stochastic multi-armed bandit problem, where an adversary can corrupt a
number of samples, and provided algorithms with learning rates that degrade according to the num-
ber of corruptions. The guarantees for stochastic multi-armed bandits were subsequently strength-
ened by Gupta et al. [GKT19] and Zimmert and Seldin [ZS19], and the concept of adversarial
corruptions has also been extended to several other settings including dynamic assortment opti-
mization [CKW19], linear bandits [LLS19] and reinforcement learning [LSSS19]. Our work differs
from these in that we use adversarial corruptions as a modeling tool to capture arbitrarily irrational
agent behavior in game-theoretic settings.2 On a technical level, our setting involves a continuous
action space, while all of the prior results involve discrete (potentially large) action spaces. More
generally, as our setting differs considerably from these prior works, achieving corruption-robustness
requires quite different algorithmic and analytical techniques.
Finally, Feng et al. [FPX19] study the problem of whether stochastic multi-armed bandit algo-
rithms are inherently robust to particular forms of strategic manipulation. This is orthogonal to
our work, where we know that agents’ irrational responses can have catastrophic effects on standard
algorithms, so we propose algorithms that are robust to them.
Further related work. Distantly related to our work are papers that study variants of bounded
rationality, especially in SSGs (see e.g., [PJT+10, HFN+16]), and other utility models from the
attacker’s perspective (e.g., [GGTT+19]). What sets apart these works from ours is that the au-
thors assume that the behavior of the agents still subscribes to some specific utility model, e.g.,
quantal responses, or responses that inflict the highest loss to the learner, despite not attacking the
target that gives them the higher value at the current round. In our paper, however, agents can
give arbitrarily different responses from their dominant behavioral model, which could prove to be
detrimental for the previously studied settings. Finally, the binary feedback model that our work
considers has similarities with the feedback model considered by two recent papers in online learning
in auctions ([WPR16, FPS18]). Apart from working in a regime without any corruptions, the tech-
niques presented in [WPR16, FPS18] are tailored to auctions and do not address multidimensional
binary search, as we consider in this work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe our model, and subsequently, we briefly review the algorithm of Lobel
et al. [LPLV18], which achieves regret O(d log(d/ε)) (for target accuracy ε > 0) for the problem of
multidimensional binary search without corruptions, where d is the dimension of the problem. This
algorithm serves as a building block in our corrupted multidimensional binary search algorithm.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the accuracy parameter is less than 1/
√
d, i.e., ε < 1/
√
d.3
2.1 Model
We consider the following repeated interaction between the learner and an opponent4 (also referred
to as nature). There is a ground truth vector θ⋆ ∈ Rd that parameterizes the behavioral model
for rational agents. Initially, the opponent chooses θ⋆ ∈ K0 = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1}. The learning
process proceeds for T rounds, and in round t:
2Chen et al. [CKW19] also consider a behavioral setting, but they do not make a connection to irrationality.
3Since our results scale logarithmically with ε, running our algorithm with smaller target accuracy ε′ < ε/
√
d
guarantees that this assumption is satisfied and contributes only an extra logarithmic term on d.
4To differentiate between the two, we refer to the learner as “she” and to the opponent as “he.”
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1. The opponent chooses (potentially adaptively) context υt from set V = {v ∈ Rd : ‖v‖2 = 1}.
2. The learner observes υt and forms a distribution Dt over potential, real-valued query points.
3. The opponent decides whether to corrupt (ct = 1) or not (ct = 0). If the round is not corrupted
(ct = 0), the parameter for the round is θt = θ
⋆; otherwise, θt is set arbitrarily.
4. The learner queries point ωt ∼ Dt and observes feedback yt = sign(〈υt,θt〉 − ωt) ∈ {−1, 1}
where sign(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and −1 otherwise. To ease exposition, we assume without loss of
generality that yt = 1,∀t ∈ [T ] by appropriately adjusting υt.5
Intuitively, θt corresponds to the behavioral model according to which the agent at round t acts.
When there is no corruption, the agent is rational with behavior dictated by the ground truth
parameter θ⋆. On the other hand, in corrupted rounds, the opponent may return arbitrary answers
potentially not aligned with the ground truth θ⋆. The opponent knows the learner’s algorithm,
along with the realization of all randomness up to and including round t − 1 (i.e., he knows all
ωτ ,∀τ ≤ t − 1) but does not have access to the learner’s randomness for the current round t (see
discussion for this modeling decision in Section 5).
We measure the performance of the learner via a notion of regret, defined as follows. In round
t, the instantaneous loss is ℓt(ωt,θt) = 1{|ωt − 〈υt,θt〉| ≥ ε}, so the learner incurs unit loss for a
prediction ωt that is ε far from the target 〈υt,θt〉. For ε-accurate predictions, the learner incurs no
loss. The cumulative loss incurred by the learner over T rounds is: R(T ) =
∑T
t=1 ℓt (ωt,θt).We refer
to this quantity as regret6 to align with prior work, and seek algorithms that minimize the regret.
We note that the learner does not observe the loss function ℓt(·,θt) or even her own loss ℓt(ωt,θt).
In the online learning terminology, the feedback is neither full-information nor bandit. Instead, the
learner only observes the binary variable yt = sign(〈υt,θt〉 − ωt) as described in Step 4 of the
protocol. In Section 5, we extend our results to two related loss functions: the symmetric and the
pricing loss, which are more relevant for some game theoretic settings (e.g., dynamic pricing).
Notation. We use bold letters to denote multi-dimensional quantities, and we define hyperplanes
in terms of their normal vectors, which we always take to have unit ℓ2 norm. To simplify notation,
we use the tuple (h, ω) to denote the hyperplane with normal vector h and intercept ω, i.e., {x :
〈h,x〉 = ω}. For normal vector h ∈ Rd and scalar ω, we use H+ (h, ω) ,H− (h, ω) to denote the
positive and negative halfspaces it creates with intercept ω, i.e., {x ∈ Rd : 〈h,x〉 ≥ ω} and {x ∈ Rd :
〈h,x〉 ≤ ω}, respectively. For a convex body K ⊂ Rd we denote by w(K,u) = maxp,q∈K〈u,p− q〉
the width of K along the direction of unit vector u. For a subspace L of K we denote by ΠLK
the projection of K onto L, formally this is {πL(x) : x ∈ K} where πL(x) is the orthogonal
projection of x onto the subspace L. We define the distance of a point κ from a hyperplane (h, ω)
as dist(κ, (h, ωt)) =
|〈h,κ〉−ω|
‖h‖2 = |〈h,κ〉 − ω|, since ‖h‖2 = 1.
2.2 Multidimensional Binary Search without corruptions
At a high level, ProjectedVolume tries to identify θ⋆. At all rounds t ∈ [T ] the algorithm
maintains a convex body, called the knowledge set and denoted by Kt ∈ Rd, which corresponds
to all values θ that are not ruled out based on the information until round t. It also maintains a
5This is without loss of generality since the algorithm can negate υt and ωt to force yt = 1.
6The terminology is apt, since with no corruptions, there is a benchmark linear prediction rule (namely υ 7→ 〈θ⋆,υ〉)
that incurs zero cumulative loss. Therefore, this performance measure captures the additional loss incurred for not
knowing the ground truth θ⋆ and which rounds are corrupted.
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set of orthonormal vectors St = {s1, . . . , s|St|}, spanning a subspace Vt of dimensionality |St|, such
that Kt has small width along any of those directions, i.e., ∀s ∈ St : w(Kt, s) ≤ δ′. The algorithm
“ignores” a dimension of Kt, once it becomes small, and focuses on the projection of Kt onto a
set Lt of dimensions that are orthogonal to St and have larger width, i.e., ∀l ∈ Lt : w(Kt, l) ≥ δ′.
The so-called Cylindrification Cyl(Kt, St), guarantees that the projection of Kt onto Lt is the same
while also regularizing the projection of Kt onto St.
Definition 2.1 (Cylindrification, Definition 4.1 of [LPLV18]). Given a set of orthonormal vectors
S = {s1, . . . , sn}, let L = {u|〈u, s〉 = 0;∀s ∈ S} be a subspace orthogonal to span(S) and ΠLK be
the projection of convex set K ⊆ Rd onto L. We define:
Cyl(K,S) :=
{
x+
n∑
i=1
yisi
∣∣∣x ∈ ΠLK and min
θ∈K
〈θ, si〉 ≤ yi ≤ max
θ∈K
〈θ, si〉
}
.
ALGORITHM 1: ProjectedVolume [LPLV18]
1 Initialize S0 ← ∅,K0 ← {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1}.
2 for t ∈ [T ] do
3 Observe context υt, chosen by the opponent.
4 Query point ωt = 〈υt,κt〉, where
κt ← apx-centroid(Cyl(Kt, St)).
5 From opponent’s response,
Kt+1 ← Kt
⋂
H+(υt, ωt) or
Kt+1 ← Kt
⋂
H−(υt, ωt).
6 Add all directions u orthogonal to St with
w(Kt+1,u) ≤ δ′ = ε216d(d+1)2 to St.
7 Set St+1 = St.
At round t, after observing υt, the algorithm
aims to query point ω⋆t = 〈υt,κ⋆t 〉, where κ⋆t
is the centroid of Cyl(Kt, St). Computing κ
⋆
t
exactly is a #P -hard problem but Lobel et al.
[LPLV18] show that an approximate centroid
κt can be computed in polynomial time and
suffices for the performance guarantee. The
algorithm therefore queries point ωt = 〈υt,κt〉.
Definition 2.2 (Centroid). The centroid κ⋆ of
a convex set K is κ⋆ = 1
vol(K)
∫
K xdx, where
vol(·) denotes the volume of a set.
Based on the opponent’s response, the algorithm eliminates one halfspace of hyperplane (υt, ωt).
The analysis uses the volume of ΠLtKt, denoted by vol (ΠLtKt), as a potential function. After
each query either the set of small dimensions St increases thus making vol (ΠLtKt) increase by
a bounded amount (which can happen at most d times) or vol (ΠLtKt) decreases by a factor of
(1− 1/e2). This potential function argument leads to a regret of at most O(d log(d/ε)).
3 Multidimensional Binary Search with known corruption level
In this section, we focus on the task of making multidimensional binary search robust to a known
corruption level C. Our main contribution here is the CorPV.K algorithm (Algorithm 2). We
state its performance guarantee in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For a known corruption level C and target accuracy ε > 0, the regret guarantee of
CorPV.K is O ((d2C + 1)d log (d/ε)). Its expected runtime is O ((d2C)C · poly (d log (d/ε) , C)).
At first glance, CorPV.K seems to suffer from two fundamental problems. First, it assumes knowl-
edge of the corruption level, which is unrealistic in our game-theoretic applications (see Section 5).
Second, its expected runtime is exponential in C. In Section 4, we address both of these problems,
by showing how CorPV.K can be extended to become agnostic to the corruption level C and have
quasi-polynomial in T expected runtime.
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0 1
θ⋆1/2
opponent’s reply
(a) Standard binary search after 1
round.
0 1
θ⋆1/2
opponent’s reply
u([0, 1/2]) = 0 u([1/2, 1]) = 1
(b) Undesirability levels after 1
round.
0 1
θ⋆1/2
opponent’s reply
u
([
0, 1
2
]) ≥ C + 1u ([ 1
2
, 1
]) ≤ C
(c) Undesirability levels after
2C + 1 round.
Figure 1: Single dimensional binary search. Opaque band denotes the knowledge set after each
query.
Warm-up: Single-dimension. In the classical single dimensional binary search without cor-
ruptions, there exists a value θ⋆ ∈ R that the learner wishes to identify by making a number of
queries/guesses. For each of the queries, the opponent replies whether the queried scalar is greater
or smaller than θ⋆, in a way that is consistent with all past replies. In this sense, from the oppo-
nent’s replies, the learner can keep a diminishing knowledge interval, where she thinks that θ⋆ lies.7
After log(1/ε) queries, this knowledge interval has shrunk enough (i.e., has length less than ε), so
that any point in it is within ε precision from θ⋆.
Imagine now that in this standard setting, the opponent is not always consistent with the ground
truth; rather, some of his replies are corrupted. Interestingly, even a single corruption suffices to
significantly mislead the algorithm. One such example is shown in Figure 1a, where the learner
queries point 1/2, and the opponent with only 1 corruption, sends the learner to the opposite
direction. This results in the learner keeping the interval [0, 1/2], instead of [1/2, 1], as her current
knowledge interval. The adverse effect that this has becomes even more apparent in the dynamic
pricing setting (Section 5).
However, if the learner knows that the maximum number of corruptions is C, then, by repeatedly
querying the same value, she can guarantee that if she observes the same answer from the opponent
for at least C+1 times, then this answer is definitely uncorrupted. In fact, if the learner repeats each
query 2C+1 times, she can run the binary search procedure and incur regret at most (2C+1) log(1/ε).
Unfortunately, this approach does not directly extend to multiple dimensions, since the opponent
provides different contexts and hence, the learner cannot repeat the exact same query.
3.1 Overview of the approach
To generalize to higher dimensions, it is helpful to rephrase the one-dimensional solution with some
additional terminology. We maintain an undesirability level for each point in the knowledge set, and
we eliminate points from the knowledge set, only when their undesirability level strictly exceeds C.
Thus, the algorithm proceeds in epochs: in each epoch φ the knowledge set Kφ remains fixed, and
we always respond to queries using the (approximate) centroid κφ of Kφ. In one dimension, we see
that after 2C + 1 queries, we must have that half of the knowledge set has undesirability at least
C + 1, so we eliminate it, shrink our knowledge set, and move to the next epoch.
In higher dimensions, the concept of undesirability levels is still extremely useful, but the rest
of the argument is substantially more intricate. We encounter 4 main challenges. We start with a
high-level description of these challenges and how we overcome them.
Challenge 1: Non-convexity of the desirable region. In the one-dimensional case, as soon
as a region has undesirability ≥ C + 1, we remove it and advance to the next epoch. In higher
dimensions, this strategy may result in a non-convex knowledge set, for which it is much more
7This corresponds to the knowledge set we mentioned in Section 2.
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analytically challenging to measure our progress (e.g., the convex hull or enclosing ellipsoid may not
shrink). An example where we obtain a non-convex knowledge set is illustrated in Figure 2. The
reason for this is that the query vectors υt observed during the epoch may all be different, and so
different regions of the knowledge set accumulate very different undesirability levels. In contrast, in
one dimension all query vectors are the same (up to sign) so we only have two distinct regions of
the knowledge set.
κ
θ⋆
h1
h2
opponent’s reply
Figure 2: Non-convex un-
desirable region when C =
1. Blue opaque region
denotes knowledge set for
next round.
The first challenge that we face is to address this non-convexity
that may arise when updating the knowledge set. Our solution avoids
non-convexity altogether: we always update the knowledge set by tak-
ing intersection with some halfspace passing near the centroid of the
knowledge set (which we call a hyperplane cut). By preserving convex-
ity, hyperplane cuts allow us to apply potential function arguments to
track progress.
Challenge 2: Existence of a hyperplane cut. Hyperplane cuts
preserve convexity, but does one even exist? It is easy to see that with
2C + 1 queries (as was sufficient in one-dimension), the answer to this
question is “no” (consider Figure 2 where a third, different hyperplane
h3 is shown and corrupted). With more queries, we might expect that
one of the context vectors υt we have seen during the epoch is a valid
hyperplane cut, separating the region with high undesirability from the rest. Indeed, as we show
in Appendix A.1, this is the case for d = 2 (Proposition A.2) but is not true in higher dimensions
(Proposition A.3).
Therefore, the second challenge is to show that a hyperplane cut even exists. We address this
challenge by searching outside of the presented contexts υt. Via an existential argument using
tools from convex analysis (in particular, Carathéodory’s theorem), we prove that if epochs have
2dC(d+1)+1 rounds, then a hyperplane cut is guaranteed to exist. To compare, in one dimension
we are guaranteed that a context vector is a hyperplane cut if epochs have 2C+1 rounds. Similarly,
with no corruptions, we are guaranteed that every single context vector is a hyperplane cut.
Challenge 3: Computing the hyperplane cut. The above argument establishes existence of
a hyperplane cut, and while this is certainly helpful, our algorithm actually needs to compute it,
so that it can update the knowledge set for the next epoch. The algorithmic question here is to
find a hyperplane passing near the centroid of the knowledge set, such that all points with low
undesirability lie in one halfspace.
We address this challenge with the Perceptron algorithm, using the fact that we can characterize
the points with low undesirability. First, we randomly sample a point q from a small ball around the
centroid of the knowledge set. Then, we run Perceptron with q as the negative example, and with the
centroid and all the points with low undesirability as the positive examples (we can efficiently search
over the latter via linear programming). If q has large margin with respect to the hyperplane whose
existence we already established, then via Perceptron’s finite mistake bound, we are guaranteed to
find a separating hyperplane. Finally, using tools from high-dimensional geometry, we prove that q
has large margin with good probability, so the procedure need not be restarted many times.
Challenge 4: Ensuring volume reduction. The final issue is that the knowledge set may have
small width in the direction of the hyperplane cut that we have found, which implies that we do
not make sufficient progress in this epoch. This was not an issue in Lobel et al., since (a) they
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ALGORITHM 2: CorruptedProjectedVolume-Known (CorPV.K)
1 Initialize φ = 1, Aφ ← ∅,Kφ ← K0, Sφ ← ∅, Lφ ← orthonormal-basis(Rd), Tφ ← ∅,
κφ ← apx-centroid(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ)), and threshold δ = ε4(d+√d)
2 for t ∈ [T ] do
3 Observe context υt, compute query point ωt = 〈υt,κφ〉 and observe opponent’s response yt.
4 if Lφ 6= ∅ and w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ),υt) > ε then ⊲ costly context
5 Update Tφ ← Tφ ∪ {t} and Aφ ← Aφ
⋃{
(ΠLφυt, ωt, yt)
}
.
6 if |Tφ| ≥ 2d · C(d+ 1) + 1 then ⊲ see Section 3.2
7 Compute: ((hφ, ψφ),Hφ(hφ, ψφ))← Elim(Aφ, Sφ). ⊲ see Section 3.3
8 Update Kφ+1 ← Kφ
⋂
Hφ(hφ, ψφ), and temporary sets S˜ ← Sφ and L˜← Lφ.
9 if w(ΠLφKφ,hφ) ≤ δ then
10 Add hyperplane to small dimensions S˜ ← Sφ
⋃{hφ}.
11 Compute orthonormal basis for new large dimensions L˜ (without S˜).
12 Update Lφ+1 ← L˜ \ {ei ∈ L˜ : w(Kφ+1, ei) ≤ δ} and Sφ+1 ← S˜
⋃(
L˜ \ Lφ+1
)
.
13 Move to next epoch: φ← φ+ 1, Tφ ← ∅, Aφ ← ∅,κφ ← apx-centroid(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ)).
always make cuts corresponding to context vectors, and (b) they can bound the regret incurred by
the width in the direction of the hyperplane cut. However, with corruptions, these two steps are
not possible. As we have discussed, no context vector may induce a valid hyperplane cut. More
insidiously, all context vectors may correspond to large width directions (so we incur large regret),
but the hyperplane found by Perceptron may have small width (so we make no volumetric progress).
We address this challenge by proving that the hyperplane found by Perceptron is orthogonal to
all of the small dimensions (recall set St in ProjectedVolume). Then, if the knowledge set has
large width in the direction of the found hyperplane, we make volumetric progress as in Lobel et
al. [LPLV18]. On the other hand, if the width is small, then we can add this direction to the set of
small dimensions. Either way we make sufficient progress.
Our algorithm. We conclude this overview by formally presenting our algorithm, CorPV.K,
with pseudocode displayed in Algorithm 2. The algorithm proceeds in epochs, and in epoch φ, we
maintain two sets of orthogonal directions Sφ and Lφ, as in ProjectedVolume. Sφ corresponds
to the learned directions and is initially empty, while Lφ corresponds to the unknown ones, so it is
initialized to an orthonormal basis for Rd. In addition, we maintain the knowledge set Kφ.
At the beginning of each epoch, we compute an approximate centroid κφ for Cyl(Kφ, Sφ) such
that ‖κφ − κ⋆φ‖ ≤ ν¯ for a scalar ν¯ to be instantiated below. For the duration of the epoch φ, we
always respond to queries with κφ, that is with context υt, our response is ωt = 〈υt,κφ〉. We collect
all the rounds for which w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ,υt)) > ε, and once we have seen 2d · C(d + 1) + 1 such
contexts, we execute the Elim subroutine to find a hyperplane cut (hφ, ψφ). The Elim routine runs
the Perceptron algorithm with a randomly sampled point as the negative example and using κφ and
all regions with low undesirability as the positive examples. It returns a halfspace that is guaranteed
to contain θ⋆ and we update the knowledge set by taking intersection with the halfspace. Then if
the updated knowledge set has small width in any large direction (for computational reasons, we
only check hφ and the basis for Lφ), we can add that direction to the set of small dimensions and
advance to the next epoch.
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3.2 Existence of Appropriately Undesirable Hyperplane
In this subsection, we prove that after |Tφ| = 2dC(d + 1) + 1 rounds, there exists a hyperplane
(hφ, ψφ) with undesirability at least C + 1 in the entirety of one of its halfspaces. Formally, this is
stated in Lemma 3.2. The results of this subsection hold for any scalar 0 < δ < ε
2
√
d+4d
, so we defer
the exact tuning of δ for Section 3.4.
Lemma 3.2. For any epoch φ, scalar δ ∈
(
0, ε
2
√
d+4d
)
, and scalar ν¯ = ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
, after |Tφ| =
2d · C(d + 1) + 1 rounds, there exists a hyperplane (hφ, ψφ) orthogonal to all small dimensions Sφ
such that dist(κφ, (hφ, ψφ)) ≤ ν¯, and the resulting halfspace Hφ(hφ, ψφ) always contains θ⋆.
At a high level, the tuning of ν¯ depends on two factors. First, in order to make sure that we make
enough progress in terms of volume elimination, despite the fact that we do not make a cut through
κφ, we need ν¯ close enough to κφ (formally stated in Lemma 3.17). The second factor that affects
the tuning of ν¯ is that we need to guarantee that there exists at least one point with a very high
undesirability level. Formally, this is established in Lemma 3.10. To assist us in the analysis, we
define the ν-margin projected undesirability levels, which we later apply for some ν < ν¯:
Definition 3.3 (ν-Margin Projected Undesirability Level). Consider an epoch φ, a scalar ν, and
a point p in Kφ. Given the set Aφ = {(ΠLφυt, ωt), yt}t∈Tφ , we define p’s ν-margin projected
undesirability level, denoted by uφ(p, ν), as the number of rounds within epoch φ, for which
uφ(p, ν) =
∑
t∈Tφ
1
{(〈
p− κφ,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
)
< 0
}
Recall that, to simplify presentation, we assume that yt = 1 for all contexts (by appropriately
adjusting υt and ωt). With this simplification, we can show the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4. If ν > ν, where ν =
√
dδ, for any point p, we have that:
uφ(p, ν) =
∑
t∈Tφ
1
{(〈
p− κφ,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
) · (〈θt − κφ,ΠLφυt〉+ ν) < 0}
Proof. In order to prove the lemma, we argue that 〈θt − κφ,ΠLφυt〉 + ν > 0. Since yt = 1, then
〈θt − κφ,υt〉 ≥ 0. Expanding the latter, we obtain that:
〈θt − κφ,ΠLφυt〉+ 〈θt − κφ,ΠSφυt〉 ≥ 0 (1)
We proceed by upper bounding the quantity 〈θt − κφ,ΠSφυt〉. Let S be a matrix with columns
corresponding to an orthonormal basis for Sφ, so that ΠSφ = SS
⊤. Then, we obtain:
〈ΠSφυt,p− κφ〉 = 〈ΠSφυt,ΠSφ(p− κφ)〉 ≤ |〈ΠSφυt,ΠSφ(p− κφ)〉|
≤ ‖ΠSφυt‖2 · ‖ΠSφ(p− κφ)‖2 (Cauchy-Schwarz inequality)
= ‖ΠSφυt‖2 · ‖S⊤(p− κφ)‖2
≤ ‖υt‖2 ·
√
d · ‖S⊤(p− κφ)‖∞ (‖x‖2 =
√∑
i∈[d] x
2
i ≤
√
d · ‖x‖2∞)
≤ 1 · δ
√
d. (‖υt‖2 = 1 and w(Kφ, s) ≤ δ,∀s ∈ Sφ)
Using the latter to relax (1) along with ν =
√
dδ we get that: 〈θt − κφ,ΠLφυt〉 ≥ −ν. Since ν > ν,
it follows that 〈θt − κφ,ΠLφυt〉+ ν ≥ −ν + ν > 0 which concludes the lemma.
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We next define the C-Protected Region in Large Dimensions, which in words is the set of points in
Kφ with ν-Margin Projected Undesirability Level at most C.
Definition 3.5 (C-Protected Region in Large Dimensions). Given set Aφ = {(ΠLφυt, ωt), yt}t∈Tφ
we define the C-Protected Region in Large Dimensions to be P(C, ν) = {p : uφ(p, ν) ≤ C}.
The next lemma establishes that if we keep set P(C, ν) intact in the convex body formed for the
next epoch Kφ+1, then we are guaranteed to not eliminate point θ
⋆.
Lemma 3.6. If ν > ν, where ν =
√
dδ, the ground truth θ⋆ belongs in set P(C, ν).
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, uφ(p, ν) =
∑
t∈Tφ 1
{(〈
p− κφ,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
) · (〈θt − κφ,ΠLφυt〉+ ν) < 0}.
For the uncorrupted rounds θ⋆ = p = θt; as a result, the corresponding summands are non-negative:(〈
p− κφ,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
) ·(〈θt − κφ,ΠLφυt〉+ ν) ≥ 0. Hence, the only rounds for which θ⋆ can incur
undesirability are the corrupted rounds, of which there are at most C. As a result, uφ(θ
⋆, ν) ≤ C
and θ⋆ ∈ P(C, ν) by Definition 3.5.
We next show that there exists a hyperplane that cuts orthogonally to all small dimensions in a
way that guarantees that set P(C, ν) is preserved in Kφ+1. Note that due to Lemma 3.6 this is
enough to guarantee that we have preserved θ⋆ in Kφ+1. However, P(C, ν) is generally non-convex
and it is not easy to directly make claims about it. Instead, we focus on its convex hull, denoted by
conv(P(C, ν)). Interestingly, we can upper bound the undesirability of any point in conv(P(C, ν)),
by applying Carathéodory’s Theorem, which says that any point in the convex hull of a (possibly
non-convex) set can be written as a convex combination of at most d+1 points of that set. Using this
result, we can bound the ν-margin projected undesirability levels of all the points in conv(P(C, ν)).
Lemma 3.7. For any scalar ν, epoch φ and any point p ∈ conv(P(C, ν)), its ν-margin projected
undesirability level is at most C(d+ 1), i.e., uφ(p, ν) ≤ C(d+ 1).
Proof. From Carathéodory’s Theorem, since p ∈ Rd and is inside conv(P(C, ν)), it can be written as
the convex combination of at most d+1 points in P(C, ν). Denoting these points by {x1, . . . ,xd+1}
such that xi ∈ P(C, ν),∀i ∈ [d + 1], p can be written as p =
∑d+1
i=1 aixi where ai ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [d + 1]
and
∑d+1
i=1 ai = 1. Hence, the ν-margin projected undesirability level of p in epoch φ is:
uφ(p, ν) =
∑
t∈Tφ
1
{(〈
p− κφ,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
)
< 0
}
(Definition 3.3)
=
∑
t∈Tφ
1

∑
i∈[d+1]
ai
(〈
xi − κφ,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qi
< 0
 (Carathéodory Theorem)
≤
∑
t∈Tφ
∑
i∈[d+1]
1
{(〈xi − κφ,ΠLφυt〉+ ν) < 0}
≤
∑
i∈[d+1]
uφ(xi, ν) ≤ C(d+ 1) (xi ∈ P(C, ν) and Definition 3.5)
The argument for the first inequality is that if Qi ≥ 0 for all xi, i ∈ [d+ 1], then the corresponding
summand contributes 0 points to uφ(p, ν), since ai ≥ 0 as this is a convex combination. As a result
each undesirability point of the left hand side of the latter inequality can be attributed to at least
one xi from the right hand side.
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Next, we prove that there exists some q ∈ Kφ such that uφ(q, ν) ≥ C(d+ 1) + 1. Note that by the
previous lemma, we know that q /∈ conv(P(C, ν)). As a result, any hyperplane separating q from
conv(P(C, ν)) preserves P(C, ν) (and as a result, θ⋆) for Kφ+1. To make sure that we also make
progress in terms of volume elimination, we show below that there exists a separating hyperplane
in the space of large dimensions (i.e., orthogonal to all small dimensions). For our analysis, we
introduce the notion of landmarks.
Definition 3.8 (Landmarks). Let basis Eφ = {e1, . . . , ed−|Sφ|} such that Eφ is orthogonal to Sφ,
any scalar δ ∈
(
0, ε
2
√
d+4d
)
, and a scalar ν¯ = ε−2
√
dδ
4
√
d
. We define the 2(d− |Sφ|) landmarks to be the
points such that Lφ = {κφ ± ν¯ · ei,∀ei ∈ Eφ}.
Landmarks possess the convenient property that at every round where the observed context υt
was such that w(Kφ,υt) ≥ ε, at least one of them accumulates a ν-margin projected undesirability
point, when ν < ν¯. Before proving this result (formally stated in Lemma 3.10) we need the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 3.9. Let basis Eφ = {e1, . . . , ed−|Sφ|} orthogonal to Sφ. For all {(υt, ωt)}t∈Tφ such that
w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ),υt) ≥ ε, there exists i such that: |〈ei,υt〉| ≥ ν¯, where ν¯ = ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
.
Proof. We first show that ‖ΠLφυt‖ ≥ ε−2
√
d·δ
4 . Since for the contexts {υt}t∈Tφ that we consider in
epoch φ it holds that: w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ),υt) ≥ ε, then there exists a point p ∈ Cyl(Kφ, Sφ) such that
|〈υt,p− κφ〉| ≥ ε2 . Applying triangular inequality:∣∣〈ΠLφυt,ΠLφ(p− κφ)〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈ΠSφυt,ΠSφ(p− κφ)〉∣∣ ≥ |〈υt,p− κφ〉| ≥ ε2 (2)
Along the directions in Sφ the following is true:
|〈ΠSφυt,ΠSφ(p− κφ)〉| ≤ ‖ΠSφυt‖2 · ‖ΠSφ(p− κφ)‖2 ≤ ‖υt‖2 ·
√
d · ‖ΠSφ(p− κφ)‖∞ ≤ 1 · δ
√
d
Using the latter, (2) now becomes:∣∣〈ΠLφυt,ΠLφ(p− κφ)〉∣∣ ≥ ε2 −√d · δ (3)
We next focus on upper bounding term
∣∣〈ΠLφυt,ΠLφ(p− κφ)〉∣∣. By applying the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, (3) becomes:∥∥ΠLφυt∥∥2 ∥∥ΠLφ(p− κφ)∥∥2 ≥ ∣∣〈ΠLφυt,ΠLφ(p− κφ)〉∣∣ ≥ ε2 −√d · δ (4)
For ‖ΠLφ(p − κφ)‖2, observe that p and κφ are inside Cyl(Kφ, Sφ), and Kφ has radius at most 1.
By the fact that p ∈ Cyl(Kφ, Sφ) and Definition 2.1, we can write it as p = x+
∑|Sφ|
i=1 yisi where si
form a basis for Sφ (which, recall, is orthogonal to Lφ) and x ∈ ΠLφKφ. Since Kφ is contained in the
unit ℓ2 ball, we also have that ΠLφKφ is contained in the unit ℓ2 ball. Hence ‖ΠLφp‖2 = ‖x‖2 ≤ 1.
The same holds for κφ, and so by the triangle inequality, we have ‖ΠLφ(p−κφ)‖2 ≤ 2. Hence, from
Equation (4) we get that: ‖ΠLφυt‖ ≥ ε−2
√
d·δ
4 .
Assume now for contradiction that there does not exist i such that |〈ei,υt〉| ≥ ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
. This
means that for all j ∈ [d− |Sφ|] and all contexts {υt}t∈Tφ : 〈ei,υt〉 < ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
. Denoting by (Eυt)j
the j-th coordinate of Eυt we have that (Eυt)j = 〈ej ,υt〉. Hence, if |〈υt, ej〉| < ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
then:
‖Eυt‖2 = ‖ΠLφυt‖2 ≤
√√√√ d∑
i=1
(〈υt, ei〉)2 <
√√√√d(ε− 2√d · δ
4
√
d
)2
<
ε− 2√d · δ
4
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which contradicts the fact that ‖ΠLφυt‖ ≥ ε−2
√
d·δ
4 established above.
The tuning of ν¯ also helps us explain the constraint imposed on δ, i.e., δ < ε
2
√
d+4δ
. This constraint
is due to the fact that since ν > ν and ν < ν¯, then it must be the case that ν < ν¯, where ν =
√
dδ
and ν¯ = ε−2
√
d
4
√
d
.
Lemma 3.10. For every round t ∈ Tφ, any scalar δ ∈ (0, ε2√d+4d ), any scalar ν < ν¯, at least one of
the landmarks in Lφ gets one ν-margin projected undesirability point, i.e.,
∃p ∈ Lφ :
(〈
p− κφ,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
)
< 0
Proof. By Lemma 3.9, there exists a direction ei ∈ E such that |〈ei,υt〉| ≥ ν¯ = ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
. The proof
then follows by showing that for ν < ν¯ landmark points q+ = κφ + ν · ei and q− = κφ − ν · ei get
different signs in the undesirability point definition. This is shown by the following derivation:(〈
q+ − κφ,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
) · (〈q− − κφ,ΠLφυt〉+ ν)
=
(〈
ν¯ · ei,ΠLφυt
〉
+ ν
) · (〈−ν¯ · ei,ΠLφυt〉+ ν)
= ν2 − (ν¯ · |〈ei,υt〉|)2 ≤ ν2 − ν¯2 < 0
where the last inequality comes from the fact that ν ∈ (ν, ν¯). As a result there exists p ∈ {q+,q−} ⊆
Lφ satisfying the condition in the lemma statement.
Since Lemma 3.10 establishes that at every round at least one of the landmarks gets a ν-margin
projected undesirability point, then if we make |Tφ| sufficiently large, by the pigeonhole principle at
least one of the landmarks has ν-margin projected undesirability at least C(d+1)+1, which allows
us to differentiate it from points in conv(P(C)). Formally:
Lemma 3.11. For scalar ν ∈ (ν, ν¯), after |Tφ| = 2d · C(d+ 1) + 1 rounds in epoch φ, there exists
a landmark p⋆ ∈ Lφ such that p⋆ /∈ conv(P(C, ν)).
Proof. At each round t ∈ Tφ, at least one of the landmarks gets a ν-margin projected undesirability
point (Lemma 3.10). Since there are at most 2d landmarks, by the pigeonhole principle after |Tφ|
rounds, there exists at least one of them with ν-margin projected undesirability uφ(p
⋆, ν) ≥ C(d+
1)+1. Since all points q inside conv(P(C, ν)) have uφ(q, ν) ≤ C(d+1), then p /∈ conv(P(C, ν)).
We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this section. We clarify that we assume that during
the computation of hφ we incur no additional regret.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. By Lemma 3.11, for ν¯ = ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
and δ ∈
(
0, ε
2
√
d+4d
)
, there exists a landmark
p⋆ ∈ Lφ that lies outside of conv(P(C, ν)). As a result, there exists a hyperplane separating p⋆
from the convex hull. We denote this hyperplane by (h⋆, ψ⋆). Recall that since p⋆ ∈ Lφ then by
definition ‖κφ − p⋆‖ = ν¯. As the hyperplane separates κφ from p⋆, we immediately have that
dist(κφ, (h
⋆, ψ⋆)) ≤ ν¯ as well. The fact that θ⋆ is always in the preserved halfspace Hφ(hφ, ψφ)
follows directly from Lemma 3.6.
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3.3 Computation of appropriately undesirable hyperplane
In this subsection we show how to compute an appropriate hyperplane cut, applying ideas from com-
putational learning theory and, in particular, the Perceptron algorithm [Ros58]. The corresponding
subroutine (Algorithm 3) is randomized and has an expected running time that is polynomial in T
and exponential8 in C. For what follows in this subsection, let B(p⋆, ζ) denote the ball of radius
ζ around p⋆, where p⋆ is the landmark such that uφ(p
⋆, ν) = C(d + 1) + 1, whose existence we
proved in Lemma 3.11. Note that although we do not a priori know the landmark corresponding to
p⋆, this can be efficiently identified since uφ(p,u) can be computed in time linear in |Tφ|.
ALGORITHM 3: Elim(Aφ, Sφ)
1 Fix a ball of radius ζ = ν¯ around p⋆: B(p⋆, ζ) ⊆ Cyl(Kφ, Sφ). ⊲ ν¯ = ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
, p⋆ ∈ Lφ
2 while true do
3 Initialize perceptron hyperplane to (h, ψ) and mistake counter to M = 0.
4 Sample a point q from B(p⋆, ζ) uniformly at random.
5 while M < d−1
ζ2·ln2(3/2) do
6 Set m← 0.
7 if q ∈ H+(h, ψ) then make perceptron update of (h, ψ) on q and set m← m+ 1.
8 if κφ ∈ H−(h, ψ) then make perceptron update of (h, ψ) on κφ and set m← m+ 1.
9 for subsets Dφ ⊆ Aφ such that |Dφ| = C do
10 Let P be the polytope created by hyperplanes of Aφ \Dφ and H−(h, ψ).
11 if P 6= ∅ then make perceptron update of (h, ψ) on z ∈ P and set m← m+ 1.
12 if m 6= 0 then increase mistake counter M ←M +m.
13 else return final (h, ψ)
We prove the following result for Elim.
Lemma 3.12. For any φ, scalar δ ∈
(
0, ε
2
√
d+4d
)
, and scalar ν¯ = ε−2
√
d·δ
4
√
d
, after |Tφ| = 2d·C(d+1)+1
rounds, algorithm Elim computes hyperplane (hφ, ψφ) orthogonal to all small dimensions Sφ such
that dist(κ⋆φ, (hφ, ψφ)) ≤ 3ν¯, and the resulting halfspace Hφ(hφ, ψφ) always contains θ⋆. The
expected runtime of this computation is:
O
(
(d− 1)3/2
ν¯2
· (d2C)C · O(LP(d,C(2d(d + 1)− 1) + 1)))
where O(LP(n,m)) denotes the computational complexity of solving a Linear Program (LP) with
n variables and m constraints.
Note that we do not consume any contexts during the execution of Elim.
Overview of Elim. At a high level Algorithm 3 does the following. In Lemma 3.2 we showed
that there exists a hyperplane (h⋆, ψ⋆) such that dist(κφ, (h
⋆, ψ⋆)) ≤ ν¯ and its associated half-
space H⋆(h⋆, ψ⋆) with undesirability at least C + 1 on one of its sides. To be more precise, if
conv(P(C, ν)) ⊆ H+(h⋆, ψ⋆), then H⋆(h⋆, ψ⋆) = H+(h⋆, ψ⋆), while if conv(P(C)) ⊆ H−(h⋆, ψ⋆),
then H⋆(h⋆, ψ⋆) = H−(h⋆, ψ⋆). In Lemma 3.11 we also showed that landmark p⋆, which is found
at distance at most ν¯ from κφ, is separated from conv(P(C, ν)) by (h⋆, ψ⋆) and has uφ(p⋆, ν) ≥
C(d+1)+1. Instead of identifying (h⋆, ψ⋆) precisely, we are going to identify hyperplane (h⋆, ψ⋆+ν¯).
8We remind the reader that, as we show in Section 4, for the cases where the corruption level is unknown our
algorithm becomes quasi-polynomial in T , via the same technique that handles the unknown amount of corruption.
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We therefore focus on a ball of radius ζ = ν¯ around p⋆ denoted by B(p⋆, ζ) and identify a
point q⋆ ∈ B(p⋆, ζ) such that 〈h⋆,q⋆ − p⋆〉 ≥ ζ·ln(3/2)√
d−1 ; this process is discussed below. Such a q
⋆
establishes that the margin between conv(P(C, ν)) and q⋆ is at least ζ·ln(3/2)√
d−1 , and we can apply
the perceptron algorithm to find a hyperplane that separates them. For every returned hyperplane
(h, ψ) from perceptron, we check whether q⋆ ∈ H−(h, ψ) and κφ ∈ H+(h, ψ), and we increase the
inner mistake counter m every time these do not hold.
Next, for every candidate hyperplane (h, ψ), we check whether there exists a point in P(C, ν) that
lies inside H−(h⋆, ψ⋆). Such a point must have been deemed undesirable by at most C hyperplanes
(Definition 3.5 and Lemma 3.4). As a result, if we remove these C hyperplanes, the polytope
P formed by the remaining |Aφ| − C hyperplanes (where |A| denotes the cardinality of a set A)
should have a non-empty intersection with H−(h⋆, ψ⋆) (point z ∈ P ). If we find such a point z
we again make an update of perceptron, and increase the inner mistake counter m. To make sure
that we check all the possible ways to remove C hyperplanes, we take all the
(|Aφ|
C
)
hyperplanes to
be removed. If no such point is found for any combination, all of P(C, ν) lies on the correct side.
Finally, the global mistake counter M and the process repeats.
Identifying a point with a large enough margin. The previous overview relies on identifying
a point q⋆ ∈ B(p⋆, ζ) such that 〈h⋆,q⋆−p⋆〉 ≥ ζ·ln(3/2)√
d−1 . If such q
⋆ has been found, and since B(p⋆, ζ)
is a subset of the unit ball in Rd, a separating hyperplane is identified after at most d−1
ζ2·ln2(3/2) , thanks
to the seminal result of Novikoff [Nov63] on the mistake bound of the Perceptron:
Lemma 3.13 (Perceptron Mistake Bound [Nov63]). Let a dataset D such that (x, y) ∈ D : ‖x‖2 ≤
R and y = {−1,+1} for a scalar R > 0. Assume that points in D are linearly separable with
a margin of γ > 0, i.e., there exists some w ∈ R such that ‖w‖2 = 1 and for all (x, y) ∈ D:
y · 〈w,x〉 > γ. Then, on input dataset D, the Perceptron algorithm makes at most R2/γ2 updates
until it returns a separating hyperplane.
To identify this q⋆ we repeatedly sample points q uniformly at random9 from B(p⋆, ζ) and apply
perceptron until d−1
ζ2·ln2(3/2) mistakes have been made. If by then the candidate hyperplane returned
from perceptron is separating (i.e., m = 0), we return it; otherwise we update the global mistake
counter M and continue with a new sampled point. The following lemma lower bounds the prob-
ability of identifying a point q such that 〈h⋆,q− p⋆〉 ≥ ψ⋆ + ζ·ln(3/2)√
d−1 by
1
20
√
d−1 . Its proof follows
arguments related to measuring the volume of the part of a sphere which is sufficiently away from
an equator [BHK16] and is provided in Appendix A.2 for completeness.
Lemma 3.14 (Volume of Cap). With probability at least 1
20
√
d−1 a point randomly sampled from
a ball of radius ζ around p⋆, B(p⋆, ζ), lies on the following halfspace: H+
(
h⋆, 〈h⋆,p⋆〉+ ζ·ln(3/2)√
d−1
)
.
This lower bound on the probability that a randomly sampled point has the large enough margin that
the Perceptron requires for efficient convergence, suffices for us to guarantee that after a polynomial
number of rounds, such a q⋆ has been identified (Lemma 3.15).
Lemma 3.15. In expectation, after N = 20
√
d− 1 number of samples from B(p⋆, ζ), at least one
of the samples lies in halfspace H+
(
h⋆, 〈h⋆,p⋆〉+ ζ·ln(3/2)√
d−1
)
.
9This can be done in a computationally efficient way by normalizing B(p⋆, ζ) to a unit ball, and then using the
techniques presented in [BHK16, Section 2.5]. Naturally, the sampled point needs to be scaled back to be inside
B(p⋆, ζ).
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Proof. From Lemma 3.14 the probability that a point randomly sampled from B(p⋆, ζ) lies on
halfspace H+
(
h⋆, 〈h⋆,p⋆〉+ ζ·ln(3/2)√
d−1
)
is at least 1
20
√
d−1 . Hence, in expectation after 20
√
d− 1
samples we have identified one such point by union bound.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.12.
Proof of Lemma 3.12. From Lemma 3.2, there exists a hyperplane (h⋆, ψ⋆) with distance at most
ν¯ from κφ that has all of P(C, ν) on H+(h⋆, ψ⋆). By Lemma 3.15, after N = 20
√
d− 1 samples
in expectation the algorithm samples a point q with margin of at least ζ·ln(3/2)√
d−1 from (h
⋆, ψ⋆). As
a result, for the iteration of this point, the perceptron algorithm can indentify a hyperplane hφ
separating q and P(C, ν) after d−1
ζ2·ln2(3/2) samples (Lemma 3.13). Since q ∈ B(p⋆, ζ), then,
‖q− κ⋆φ‖ = ‖q− κφ + κφ − κ⋆φ‖
≤ ‖q− κφ‖+ ‖κφ − κ⋆φ‖ (triangular inequality)
≤ ‖q− κφ‖+ ν¯ (approximation of κ⋆φ in polynomial time)
= ‖q− p⋆ + p⋆ − κφ‖+ ν¯
≤ ‖q− p⋆‖+ ‖p⋆ − κφ‖+ ν¯ (triangular inequality)
≤ ν¯ + ν¯ + ν¯ (q ∈ B(p⋆, ζ) and Definition 3.8)
Hence, dist(κ⋆φ, (hφ, ψφ)) ≤ 3ν¯.
The expected runtime of Elim isN times the complexity for each iteration of the outer while loop.
At every iteration of the inner while loop, the algorithm checks whether q and κφ are on the correct
side of h and possibly updates the perceptron (this is done in time O(1)). The most computationally
demanding part is Steps 8–10 where we check whether the hyperplane cuts some part of P(C). For
that, we check all the possible
(|Aφ|
C
) ≤ (2dC(d + 1) + 1)C = Θ((d2C)C) combinations of which C
hyperplanes to disregard and solve an LP for each such combination. These LPs have at most d
variables (since Kφ ⊆ Rd) and |Aφ|−C = C(2d(d+1)−1)+1) constraints. Denoting the complexity
of solving an LP with n variables andm constraints as O(LP(n,m)) we therefore obtain that Steps 8–
10 have computational complexity O
(
O(LP(d,C(2d(d + 1)− 1) + 1))) · (d2C)C). This concludes
our proof.
3.4 Bounding Regret via Volume Progress
Having established the essential properties about the hyperplane hφ, we now proceed with proving
the regret guarantee. Our proof follows the analysis of Lobel et al. [LPLV18] with a crucial difference:
when ProjectedVolume observes a context such that w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ),υt) ≤ ε, the latter can be
automatically discarded, since it does not contribute to the regret. In our epoch-based setting, this
would translate into ignoring a returned hyperplane by Elim (hφ, ψφ) if w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ),hφ) ≤ ε.
However, when Elim returns a hyperplane hφ with w(Kφ,hφ) < ε, we cannot relate this information
to the regret of epoch φ. This is due to the fact that for all rounds comprising the epoch, the width
of Kφ in the direction of the observed context was greater than ε.
What we do know is that (hφ, ψφ) is orthogonal to all the small dimensions Sφ. So, we set a
threshold of δ and if w(Kφ,hφ) < δ (Step 11), then we have identified a dimension in ΠLφKφ
10 with
width at most δ. We can therefore include it in the set of small dimensions for the next epoch Sφ+1.
10Since hφ is orthogonal to the small dimensions Sφ, then it must lie in the space of large dimensions Lφ.
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Auxiliary lemmas. First, we list several lemmas that are useful for the proof of Theorem 3.1,
starting with the Directional Grünbaum which relates the width of K
⋂{x|〈u,x − κ〉 ≥ 0} (where
u is any unit vector and κ is K’s centroid) with the width of K towards any unit vector v.
Lemma 3.16 (Directional Grünbaum [LPLV18, Theorem 5.3]). If K is a convex body and κ is its
centroid, then, for every unit vector u 6= 0, the set K+ = K
⋂{x|〈u,x − κ〉 ≥ 0} satisfies:
1
d+ 1
w(K,v) ≤ w(K+,v) ≤ w(K,v)
for all unit vectors v.
The Approximate Grünbaum relates the volume of a set Kµ+ = {x ∈ K : 〈u,x − κ〉 ≥ µ} with the
volume of set K, when µ ≤ 1/d for any unit vector u.
Lemma 3.17 (Approximate Grünbaum). Let K be a convex body and κ be its centroid. For an
arbitrary unit vector u and a scalar µ such that 0 < µ < 1d , let K
µ
+ = {x ∈ K : 〈u,x − κ〉 ≥ µ}.
Then: vol
(
Kµ+
) ≥ 1
2e2
vol(K).
The proof of this lemma (provided in Appendix A.3 for completeness) is similar to the proof of
[LPLV18, Lemma 5.5] with the important difference that µ is no longer w(K,u)/(d + 1)2, but
rather, µ < 1/d.
The cylindrification lemma relates the volume of the convex body to the volume of its projection
onto a subspace.
Lemma 3.18 (Cylindrification [LPLV18, Lemma 6.1]). Let K be a convex body in Rd such that
w(K,u) ≥ δ′ for every unit vector u. Then, for every (d− 1)-dimensional subspace L it holds that
vol(ΠLK) ≤ d(d+1)δ′ vol(K)
The next lemma states that a convex body K with width at least δ in every direction must fit a
ball of diameter δ/d inside it.
Lemma 3.19 ([LPLV18, Lemma 6.3]). If K ⊂ Rd is a convex body such that w(K,u) ≥ δ for every
unit vector u, then K contains a ball of diameter δ/d.
Putting everything together. Using the approximate Grünbaum, we can prove our epoch based
projected variant, presented formally below.
Lemma 3.20 (Epoch Based Projected Grünbaum). Setting δ = ε
4(d+
√
d)
, then forKφ+1 = Kφ
⋂
Hφ(hφ, ψφ),
where Hφ(hφ, ψφ) was the halfspace returned from Elim it holds that:
vol
(
ΠLφKφ+1
) ≤ (1− 1
2e2
)
vol(ΠLφKφ)
Proof. By Lemma 3.12, we know that Elim returned hyperplane (hφ, ψφ) orthogonal to all small
dimensions, such that dist(κ⋆φ, (hφ, ψφ)) ≤ 3ν¯ = 3 · ε−2
√
dδ
4
√
d
. Substituting δ = ε
4(d+
√
d)
we get that:
dist(κ⋆φ, (hφ, ψφ)) ≤
(2
√
d+ 1)ε
2
√
d(
√
d+ 1)
≤ 1
d
where the last inequality uses the fact that ε ≤ 1/√d and that 2
√
d+1√
d+1
≤ 2. Hence, the clause in
the approximate Grünbaum lemma (Lemma 3.17) holds and as a result, applying the approximate
Grünbaum lemma with K = ΠLφKφ, the lemma follows.
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We are now ready to present the proof for the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We use Γφ = vol
(
ΠLφKφ
)
as our potential function. Note that when Lφ
becomes empty, Sφ must be an orthonormal basis for which w(Kφ, s) ≤ δ,∀s ∈ Sφ. For any received
context υ after that point we have the following. First, υ =
∑
i∈[|Sφ|] ai · si, and for any vector a it
holds that: ‖a‖1 ≤
√
d · ‖a‖2. So, the width of Kφ in the direction of υ when |Sφ| = d is:
w(Kφ,υ) = max
p,q∈Kφ
〈υ,p− q〉 (definition of width)
≤
∑
i∈[|Sφ|]
ai · max
p,q∈Kφ
〈si,p− q〉 (υ =
∑
i∈[|Sφ|] aisi and properties of max(·))
≤
∑
i∈[|Sφ|]
ai · δ (definition of small dimensions)
≤ ‖a‖1 · δ ≤
√
dδ‖a‖2 (‖a‖1 ≤
√
d · ‖a‖2)
Substituting δ = ε
4(d+
√
d)
the latter becomes: w(Kφ,υ) ≤ ε4(√d+1) ≤ ε. Therefore, when Lφ = ∅,
then CorPV.K incurs no additional regret for any context it might receive. For that, we analyze
the potential function Γφ until Lφ = ∅.
We first focus on rounds t ∈ Tφ such that w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ),υt) ≤ ε (checked in Step 3), for which
we incur no additional regret if the round is not corrupted. If these rounds were corrupted, then
this adds an extra C term to the cumulative regret upper bound that we prove.
We present the lower bound for Γφ ≥ Ω
(
δ
d
)2d
. First, we note that Step 11 of CorPV.K ensures
that for all u ∈ Lφ it holds that w
(
ΠLφKφ,u
) ≥ δ. As a result, from Lemma 3.19, ΠLφKφ contains
a ball of radius δ|Lφ| , so vol
(
ΠLφKφ
) ≥ V (d)( δ|Lφ|)|Lφ|, where by V (d) we denote the volume of the
d-dimensional unit ball. Using the fact that |Lφ| ≤ d and V (d) ≥ Ω
(
1
d
)d
, the latter can be lower
bounded by Ω
(
δ
d
)2d
. Hence, Γφ = vol
(
ΠLφKφ
) ≥ Ω ( δd)2d.
We split our analysis of the upper bound of Γφ in two parts. In the first part, we study the
potential function between epochs where the set of large dimensions Lφ does not change. In the
second part, we study the potential function between where the set of large dimensions Lφ becomes
smaller. For both cases, we use the fact that from Lemma 3.20 we have that:
vol
(
ΠLφKφ+1
) ≤ (1− 1
2e2
)
vol
(
ΠLφKφ
)
(5)
For the case where the set Lφ does not change between epochs φ, φ+1 (i.e., Lφ = Lφ+1) Equation (5)
becomes:
vol
(
ΠLφ+1Kφ+1
) ≤ (1− 1
2e2
)
vol
(
ΠLφKφ
)
(6)
For the other case, the set of small dimensions increases from Sφ to Sφ+1. By the definition of large
dimensions, w(Kφ,u) ≥ δ,∀u ∈ Lφ. So, if we were to cut Kφ with a hyperplane that passes precisely
from the centroid κ⋆φ then, from Lemma 3.16 w(Kφ+1,u) ≥ δd+1 . Since, however, we make sure that
we cut Kφ through the approximate centroid κφ, then w(Kφ+1,u) ≥ δd+1 . This is due to the fact
that the halfspace Hφ(hφ, ψφ) returned from Elim always contains κφ (since uφ(κφ,u) = 0). Since
‖κφ − κ⋆φ‖ ≤ ν then κ⋆φ ∈Hφ(hφ,κφ). Hence, applying Lemma 3.18 we obtain:
vol
(
ΠLφ+1Kφ+1
) ≤ d(d + 1)2
δ
vol
(
ΠLφKφ+1
)
(7)
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Since we add at most d new directions to Sφ, the volume of K0 is upper bounded by O(1), and
using the lower bound for Γφ that we computed, we have that:
Ω
(
δ
d
)2d
≤ ΓΦ = vol (ΠLΦKΦ) ≤ O(1) ·
(
d(d+ 1)2
δ
)d
·
(
1− 1
2e2
)Φ
where by Φ we denote the total number of epochs. Solving the above in terms of Φ and substituting
δ we obtain: Φ ≤ O(d log dε ).
From Lemma 3.2 we have that in order to be able to guarantee that there exists an appropriate
separating hyperplane (hφ, ψφ) for epoch φ we need at most 2dC(d+1)+1 rounds per epoch. Thus,
the total regret incurred is upper bounded by:
O
(
(2dC(d+ 1) + 1) d log
d
ε
+C
)
.
4 Robustness to unknown corruption level
In this section, we introduce algorithm CorPV.A, which achieves similar regret guarantees as
CorPV.K (up to logarithmic factors) but is also robust to an unknown level of corruptions. Our
solution draws intuition from a framework developed by Lykouris et al. [LMPL18] and its byproduct
is that CorPV.A has running time quasi-polynomial in T . Our main result here is the following.
Theorem 4.1. For target accuracy ε > 0, CorPV.A (Algorithm 4) is agnostic to the corruption
level, has expected runtime O
((
d2 log T
)log T+3 · poly (d log d/ε, log T )), and incurs expected regret:
O (d3 log (d/ε) log(T ) · (log T + C))
Our results shed light into novel features of the two techniques (subsampling and global eliminations)
presented by Lykouris et al. [LMPL18]. Notably, we show that global eliminations can be extended
to convex bodies, and that the subsampling technique can yield quasipolynomial running time when
the base algorithm has running time scaling exponentially in the number of corruptions.
At a high level, our algorithm has the following properties. First, it maintains log T layers, each
of which corresponds to a different corruption level; i.e., layer ℓ = i corresponds to corruption level
C = 2i. The layers run instances of CorPV.K in parallel so that we can be robust to any amount
of corruptions. Second, at each round t ∈ [T ] the learner samples and acts according to layer ℓ
with probability 2−ℓ. As a result, layers with larger indices are slower (i.e., sampled less often),
but more robust in terms of corruptions. Similarly to [LMPL18, Lemma 3.3] (whose statement we
include below for completeness) each layer ℓ ≥ logC observes at most ln (1/βℓ)+3 corruptions, with
probability 1− βℓ.
Lemma 4.2 ([LMPL18, Lemma 3.3]). For corruption level C, each layer ℓ ≥ logC observes a
constant number of corruptions on expectation during the exploration phase. With probability at
least 1− β, the corruption it observes is at most ln (1/β) + 3.
For each round t ∈ [T ], each layer ℓ ∈ [log T ] can be at a different phase, denoted by φ(ℓ) and as
a result, each layer holds its own knowledge set, denoted by Kℓ,φ(ℓ), which is potentially different
from the knowledge sets of other layers. That said, the log T layers are coupled through a global
eliminations technique extended for continuous spaces, so that their knowledge sets are consistent,
i.e., for two layers ℓ′ ≤ ℓ it is either non-empty such that Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′) ⊆ Kℓ,φ(ℓ), or Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′) is the empty
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ALGORITHM 4: CorruptedProjectedVolume-Agnostic(CorPV.A)
1 Initialize all layer-specific quantities: ∀ℓ ∈ [logT ] : φ(ℓ)← 1, Aℓ,φ(ℓ) ← ∅,Kℓ,φ(ℓ) ← K0,
Sℓ,φ(ℓ) ← ∅, Lℓ,φ(ℓ) ← orthonormal-basis(Rd), Tℓ,φ(ℓ) ← ∅,κℓ,φ(ℓ) ← apx-centroid(Cyl(Kℓ,φ(ℓ))), emptyℓ ← 0,
threshold δ = ε
4(
√
d+d)
and C˜ = log
(
min
{
T, 1ε
} · T ).
2 for rounds t ∈ [T ] do
3 Observe context υt.
4 Sample layer ℓ ∈ [logT ] with probability 2−ℓ. With remaining probability, sample ℓ = 1.
5 if not emptyℓ then
6 Compute query point ωℓ,t = 〈υt,κℓ,φ(ℓ)〉 and observe opponent’s response yt.
7 if Lℓ,φ(ℓ) 6= ∅ and w(Cyl(Kℓ,φ(ℓ), Sℓ,φ(ℓ)),υt) > ε then
8 Update Tℓ,φ(ℓ) ← Tℓ,φ(ℓ) + {t}.
9 Update set of hyperplanes: Aℓ,φ(ℓ) ← Aℓ,φ(ℓ)
⋃{(
ΠLℓ,φ(ℓ)υt, ωℓ,t
)
, yt
}
.
10 if |Tℓ,φ(ℓ)| ≥ 2d · C˜ · (d+ 1) + 1 then ⊲ end of ℓ’s epoch
11 Compute: ((hℓ,φ, ψℓ,φ(ℓ)),Hℓ,φ(ℓ)(hℓ,φ(ℓ), ψℓ,φ(ℓ)))← Elim(Aℓ,φ(ℓ), Sℓ,φ(ℓ)).
12 Update Kℓ,φ(ℓ)+1 ← Kℓ,φ(ℓ)
⋂
Hℓ,φ(ℓ)(hℓ,φ(ℓ), ψℓ,φ(ℓ)), S˜ ← Sℓ,φ(ℓ), L˜← Lℓ,φ(ℓ).
13 if w(ΠLℓ,φ(ℓ)Kℓ,φ(ℓ),hℓ,φ(ℓ)) ≤ δ then
14 Add hyperplane to small dimensions S˜ ← Sℓ,φ(ℓ)
⋃{hℓ,φ(ℓ)}.
15 Compute orthonormal basis for new large dimensions L˜ (without S˜).
16 Update Lℓ,φ(ℓ)+1 ← L˜ \ {ei ∈ L˜ : w(Kℓ,φ(ℓ)+1, ei) ≤ δ}, Sℓ,φ(ℓ)+1 ← S˜
⋃(
L˜ \ Lℓ,φ(ℓ)+1
)
.
17 for all layers ℓ′ ≤ ℓ in decreasing order do
18 Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′) ← Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′)
⋂
ℓ′′≥ℓ′ Kℓ′′,φ(ℓ′′)
19 emptyℓ′ ← 1
{
Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′) = ∅
}
20 Move to next epoch φ(ℓ′)← φ(ℓ′) + 1, Tℓ′,φ(ℓ′) ← ∅, Aℓ′,φ(ℓ′) ← ∅.
21 if not emptyℓ′ then
22 Update Lℓ′,φ(ℓ′) ← Lℓ′,φ(ℓ′)−1 \ {ei ∈ Lℓ′,φ(ℓ′)−1 : w(Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′), ei) ≤ δ} &
23 Sℓ′,φ(ℓ′) ← Sℓ′,φ(ℓ′)−1
⋃(
Lℓ′,φ(ℓ)−1 \ Lℓ′,φ(ℓ′)
)
24 Compute κℓ′,φ(ℓ′) ← apx-centroid(Cyl(Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′), Sℓ′,φ(ℓ′))).
25 else
26 Find first layer ℓ˜ ≥ ℓ such that Kℓ˜,φ(ℓ˜) 6= ∅.
27 Query a random point from Kℓ˜,φ(ℓ˜).
set. If a layer ℓ′ is completely eliminated (i.e., Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′) = ∅), then, every time that ℓ′ is sampled our
algorithm makes a query in a way consistent to the smaller layer non-empty knowledge set. More
formally, the algorithm queries any point x ∈ Cyl (Kℓ,φ(ℓ), Sℓ,φ(ℓ)), where ℓ is the smallest layer
ℓ ≥ ℓ′ such that Kℓ,φ(ℓ) 6= ∅, and none of the knowledge sets gets updated.
Global Eliminations for continuous spaces. Assume that layer ℓ has determined that the sep-
arating hyperplane should be (h⋆ℓ,φ(ℓ), ψ
⋆
ℓ,φ(ℓ)) and the halfspace to be preserved is H
⋆(h⋆ℓ,φ(ℓ), ψ
⋆
ℓ,φ(ℓ)).
Then, since layer ℓ is by definition more robust to corruptions than all layers ℓ′ ≤ ℓ, it is in our best
interest to update Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′) for all layers ℓ
′ ≤ ℓ, such that Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′) ← Kℓ′,φ(ℓ′)
⋂
ℓ′′≥ℓ′ Kℓ′′,φ(ℓ′′) and
have layer ℓ′ move to the next epoch. In words, this ensures the consistency property of our layers.
After every update of a layer’s knowledge set, the sets of small and large dimensions are re-computed.
Note here that since we always cut the knowledge sets with hyperplanes, the remaining knowledge
sets are always convex bodies.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We separate the layers into two categories: layers ℓ ≥ logC are corruption-
tolerant, and layers ℓ < logC are corruption-intolerant. Every layer ℓ, if it were to run in isolation,
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would spend Φℓ epochs until converging to a knowledge set with width at most ε in all the directions.
However, in CorPV.A layer ℓ’s epoch potentially gets increased every time that a layer ℓ′ ≥ ℓ
changes epoch. Since there are at most log T layers, this results in an added log T multiplicative
overhead for the epochs of each layer. This overhead is suffered by the corruption-tolerant layers.
We first study the performance of the corruption-tolerant layers. From Lemma 4.2 we have that
with probability at least 1− βℓ, the actual corruption experienced by the tolerant layers is at most
C˜ = ln
(
1
βℓ
)
+ 3 ≤ log
(
min
{
T,
1
ε
}
· 1
βℓ
)
. (8)
Applying the regret guarantee of Theorem 3.1 for all rounds that this corruption-tolerant layer was
sampled, the regret incurred by each of the tolerant layers ℓ is upper bounded by:
Rℓ ≤ O
((
d2C˜ + 1
)
d log
(
d
ε
))
(9)
Since there are at most log T such layers, then with failure probability βℓ we have that the expected
regret incurred by all the corruption-tolerant layers in upper bounded by:
Rtolerant ≤
log(T )∑
ℓ=1
Rℓ (10)
We now move to the analysis of the corruption-intolerant layers. Let ℓ⋆ denote the smallest
corruption-tolerant layer, i.e., ℓ⋆ = minℓ {ℓ ≥ logC}. Observe that each layer ℓ ≤ ℓ⋆ is played
until layer ℓ⋆ identifies the target knowledge set having directional width at most ε in every direc-
tion. If ℓ⋆ was run in isolation, from Equation (9) it would incur regret Rℓ⋆ . When a context is
not costly for ℓ⋆, it is also not costly for layers ℓ < ℓ⋆ (this follows because we have consistent sets
across layers). As a result, whenever a context may cause regret for a corruption-intolerant layer,
with probability 1/C, ℓ⋆ is selected and it makes progress towards identifying the target. Hence, the
total regret from corruption-intolerant layers can be bounded by the total regret incurred by the
first corruption-tolerant layer times C (as the latter layer is selected every 1/C costly contexts in
expectation). This means that we incur a regret of O (C(2d(d+ 1) logC + 1)d(log d/ε) log T ) until
the appropriately small knowledge set is constructed for ℓ⋆; subsequently this knowledge set dictates
the behavior of the intolerant layers. Since we do not know which layer is ℓ⋆, taking a union bound,
we have that the expected regret incurred by the intolerant layers is:
Rintolerant ≤ C · Rℓ⋆ (11)
Putting everything together, the regret experienced by CorPV.A is comprised by the regret of
the corruption-tolerant (Equation (10)) and the corruption-intolerant layers (Equation (11)). As a
result, combined with Equations (8) and (9), the total expected regret is upper bounded by:
R = Rtolerant +Rintolerant ≤ O
(
(log T + C) ·
(
d2C˜ + 1
)
d log
(
d
ε
))
≤ O
(
d3 · log
(
min
{
T,
d
ε
}
· 1
βℓ
)
· log
(
d
ε
)
· (log(T ) + C)
)
Setting βℓ = 1/T gives us the desired guarantee.
Now we turn to the computational complexity of CorPV.A. Note that the complexity is
dictated by the choice of C˜ = log(T ) + 3. As a result, from Lemma 3.12, substituting C with log T ,
we get that CorPV.A has expected runtime: O
((
d2 log T
)log T+3 · poly (d log dε , log T )).
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5 Applications to game theory
In this section, we study the implications of our results for learning in the presence of irrational
agents in three game-theoretic settings: dynamic pricing for linear buyers, Stackelberg Security
Games (SSGs), and dynamic pricing for Lipschitz buyers ([MPLS18]). Naturally, in such settings
we do not know a priori the total number of irrational agents C. For ease of exposition, we present
the intuition of our algorithms assuming that C is known, given that one can easily then extend
them to the case of unknown C using variants of CorPV.A. Our result statements, however, reflect
the unknown C case. At a high level, the algorithms for learning in all these game-theoretic settings
are based on variants of binary search. Our approach is hence to ensure that the binary-search
type modules are robust to irrational responses. We also find it useful to note that the “decision”
of whether a round was corrupted or not is not a strategic11 one. For example, in “online” dynamic
pricing, where we can think of agents arriving one at a time, the irrationality intuition is that some
of the agents themselves may be irrational, which is not a function of the price we post. Finally, we
note that in SSGs and dynamic pricing with Lipschitz buyers a single dimensional variant of our
results suffices, and the dependence on d that appears in Corollaries 5.2 and 5.3 is inherent to the
non-corrupted versions of these problems.
5.1 Dynamic Pricing for Linear Buyers
The close connection between the problem of contextual multi-dimensional binary search and dy-
namic pricing had already been observed by several works (e.g., [CLPL19, LPLV18, PLS18]). In the
language of dynamic pricing, υt is the item’s feature vector, the learner’s query ωt corresponds to
the price that a seller sets, and the opponent’s reply corresponds to whether the buyer buys the item
at the queried price or not. If the opponent is rational, he buys the item if its price is less than his
valuation for the item, i.e., if 〈θ⋆,υt〉 ≥ ωt. The difference between the settings of multidimensional
binary search and dynamic pricing is the learner’s loss function: in dynamic pricing, if the buyer
purchases the item at price ωt, the loss that the learner incurs is 〈θ⋆,υt〉−ωt, otherwise the learner’s
loss is 〈θ⋆,υt〉. This loss function, which accounts for the loss in revenue that the seller suffers at
each round, is called the pricing loss.
Albeit different from the loss function we consider in Sections 3 and 4, the results of those
sections carry over for the pricing loss with a small modification. For every round t and according
to context υt we distinguish two cases: if w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ),υt) ≤ ε then, the learner queries price12
ωt = 〈υt,κφ〉−ε. This price guarantees that a sale occurs at round t, and the learner gets revenue ωt.
In other words, in these rounds the pricing loss is only ε. If w(Cyl(Kφ, Sφ),υt) ≥ ε then, the learner
queries price ωt = 〈υt,κφ〉. Putting all these together and accounting for the fact that there are at
most C corrupted rounds: Rpricing(T ) ≤ C + Rexplore + Rexploit ≤ C + RCorPV.K(T ) + ε · T . This
equation also explains the role of the target accuracy ε in a dynamic pricing setting: a target accuracy
of ε = 1/T is enough to guarantee that for the known C case Rpricing(T ) ≤ C +O (RCorPV.K(T )).
Note that this idea directly extends to the unknown C case too, as every exploit price for layer ℓ is
also a valid exploit price for all layers ℓ′ ≤ ℓ due to their knowledge sets being consistent.
Corollary 5.1 (Dynamic Pricing with Irrational Responses Regret). CorPV.A applied to dynamic
pricing with an unknown number of irrational responses and target accuracy ε = d/T yields regret
Rpricing(T ) = O
(
d3 log2(T ) (log T +C)
)
.
11In fact any deterministic algorithm for learning in the presence of irrational agents would yield linear regret, even
with a minimal number of irrational responses.
12This corresponds to the quantity called “exploit” price by Cohen et al. [CLPL19].
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5.2 Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs)
Let D = {1, . . . , d} denote the set of targets, and pi,t ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ [d] the probability that the learner
protects target i at round t. We refer to each vector pt = (p1,t, . . . , pd,t) as the coverage probabilities.
The utilities of both the attacker and the learner are linear in the coverage probabilities that the
learner deploys. The interaction protocol between the learner and the opponent13 is the following.
First, the learner commits to coverage probability distribution pt ∈ [0, 1]d. Next, the opponent
observes pt, and chooses to attack target it(pt), which is ultimately observed by the learner. We
note that in SSGs the ground truth θ⋆ corresponds to the optimal coverage probability that the
learner can commit to, based on the responses from the opponent. In standard SSGs, the attacker
is always best responding, i.e., it(pt) = argmaxi∈D Uo(i,pt), where by Uo(i,pt) we denote the
attacker’s utility for attacking target i under coverage probability pt from the learner.
In SSGs where the opponent can make completely irrational choices, target it(pt) can be any
target in D (i.e., not necessarily argmaxi∈D Uo(i,pt)) during at most C rounds. For the case where
C = 0 (i.e., fully rational opponent) the currently known best-performing algorithm14 is due to
[PSTZ19]. The core idea behind the algorithm of Peng et al. [PSTZ19] is that in the d-simplex,
the learner’s probabilities for which the opponent attacks a specific target form polytopes (see e.g.,
Figure 3 for an example with 3 targets).
θ1
θ2
1
1
target 1
target 2
target 3
Figure 3: Learner’s sim-
plex.
The algorithm of Peng et al. [PSTZ19] is prone to being manipu-
lated by irrational responses every time that it has to decide whether to
calibrate pt+1 according to it(pt) or not. As we observe, in order to be
robust to irrational agents, the algorithm should calibrate pt+1 according
to it(pt) only when the learner is certain that it(pt) would be attacked
by a rational agent. In the presence of irrational agents, we maintain
an undesirability level for each target i ∈ D and increment it each time
target i is attacked. Once a target has reached undesirability level C+1,
then we know for sure that it is one of the targets that the fully rational
opponent would attack. More details can be found in Appendix B.1.
Corollary 5.2 (SSGs with Irrational Responses). The regret incurred by the aforementioned algo-
rithm which is robust against an unknown number of C irrational responses is: O˜((2C logC)d3 log T ),
where O˜(·) hides dependencies in the representation precision.
5.3 Learning a Lipschitz Function with Binary Feedback
In the problem of learning a Lipschitz function with binary feedback, recently studied by [MPLS18],
a learner tries to learn a Lipschitz function f : [0, 1]d → [0, 1] repeatedly over T rounds. In each
round t ∈ [T ], the learner observes an adversarially chosen context xt. The learner then submits
a guess about f(xt), which we denote by yt, and the opponent responds whether yt > f(xt) or
yt < f(xt). For round t ∈ [T ] the learner incurs loss ℓ(f(xt)− yt) = |f(xt)− yt|, i.e., symmetric.
Our algorithm for learning in the presence of such irrational agents extends the algorithm of
Mao et al. [MPLS18], which at a high level works as follows. The learner maintains a partitioning of
the domain [0, 1]d into d-dimensional “boxes”. For each box Xj the learner maintains an estimated
13We note that [BBHP15] study online learning algorithms in SSGs against multiple, known types of opponents.
Although we believe that the our technique could also be useful in these settings, in such a setting there is no inherent,
consistent “ground truth” similar to a single θ⋆ which is essential for any binary-type setting and for which CorPV.K
readily applies.
14The results of their algorithm are stated in terms of sample complexity, we note that one can easily turn them
into a no-regret learning algorithm (see e.g., Algorithm 5) with regret guarantees O(d3).
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interval of where f(x) for x ∈ Xj lies, denoted by Yj. For every xt queried, after the learner observes
whether yt > f(xt) or yt < f(xt), the learner updates the estimated Yj . Once Yj has been estimated
to a satisfactory degree, the interval Xj gets partitioned in 2
d smaller boxes and the process repeats.
For robustness, we must ensure that for each Xj the associated Yj always contains the interval
[minx∈Xj f(x),maxx∈Xj f(x)]. As before, we do this by tracking undesirability levels on subintervals
of Yj. Specifically, if yt > f(xt), then we increase the undesirability of interval Yj\[0, yt+Lℓj], where
ℓj = diam(Xj), otherwise we increase the undesirability of interval Yj \ [yt − Lℓj, 1]. After 2C + 1
queries in interval Xj , there exists a subinterval of Yj with undesirability level at least C + 1 and
we can safely eliminate it from Yj. Our algorithm is presented in Appendix B.2 for completeness.
Corollary 5.3. Algorithm 9 applied to a setting of learning an L-Lipschitz function with binary
feedback, symmetric15 loss functions and with an unknown number of irrational responses yields
regret: R(T ) = O
(
(2C logC + 1)LT
d−1
d
log T
)
.
15Our approach presented in Algorithm 9 can be easily adapted if the learner measures her regret in terms of
pricing loss.
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A Supplementary material for Section 3
A.1 Supplementary material for Section 3.1
Definition A.1 (Undesirability Level). For an epoch φ ∈ Φ, let p be a point in Kφ. We define
p’s undesirability level for epoch φ, denoted by uφ(p), as the number of rounds within epoch φ, for
which
uφ(p) =
∑
t∈Tφ
1 {〈p− κφ,υt〉 · yt < 0}
We next present two useful propositions regarding the number of contexts needed in order to guaran-
tee that we have found an appropriately undesirable hyperplane, for the cases of d = 2 and d = 3 re-
spectively.
κφ
υ1(ωφ)
υ2(ωφ)
υ3(ωφ)
θ
⋆
1
23
2
1 0
Figure 4: Sketch of the un-
desirability levels for epoch
φ, after 2C + 1 uncorrupted
rounds (i.e., ct = 0), assum-
ing that each context appears
once. Red numbers denote
undesirability of each region.
Blue opaque region denotes
the knowledge set for epoch
φ+ 1.
Proposition A.2. For d = 2 and any corruption level C, after
3C + 1 rounds within an epoch, there exists a hyperplane υ∗(ωφ)
among {υt(ωφ)}t∈Tφ with undesirability level at least C + 1 in the
entirety of one of its halfspaces.
Proof. Since we know that there exist at most C corrupted rounds
among the 3C + 1 rounds of epoch φ, then at least 2C + 1 are
uncorrupted. We say that these rounds are part of the set Uφ. For
all t ∈ Uφ, the learner’s {υt(ωt)}t∈Uφ pass from the same centroid κφ
and they all protect the region where θ⋆ lies. In other words, none
among {υt}t∈Uφ adds an undesirability point to θ⋆. See Figure 4
for a depiction for the case where C = 1 and each context appears
only once. Since all hyperplanes point towards the same direction
(i.e., the region containing θ⋆ never gets an undesirability point),
starting from the region where θ⋆ lies and moving counter clockwise
the undesirability levels of the formed regions first increase (moving
from 0 to 2C + 1) and then decrease (moving from 2C + 1 to 0).
Due to this being a concave function, it is clear to see that there
always exists a hyperplane with undesirability level at least C + 1
in the entirety of one of its halfspaces.
Proposition A.3. For d = 3, any corruption level C, any centroid κ and any number of rounds N
during epoch φ, there exists a θ⋆ and a sequence of N contexts {υt}Nt=1, such that there does not
exist a hyperplane υ∗ ∈ {υt}Nt=1 with either of its halfspaces having undesirability at least C + 1.
Proof. For any convex body K with centroid κ, we show how to construct a problematic instance
of a θ⋆ and N contexts. Fix the corruption level to be C = 1, and ct = 0,∀t ∈ [N ]. However,
the learner does not know that none of the rounds is corrupted. Construct a sequence of contexts
{υt}Nt=1 such that no two are equal and for ωt = 〈υt,κ〉,∀t ∈ [N ] we have that:
{υt1(ωt1)}
⋂
{υt2(ωt2)} = κ
and the smallest region r⋆ that contains θ⋆ is defined by all {υt}Nt=1 Intuitively, these hyperplanes
form a conic hull.
Take any hyperplane h ∈ R3 neither parallel nor orthogonal with any hyperplane {υt(ωt)}Nt=1
such that h ∩ r⋆ = q 6= ∅. Take q’s projection in R2. Observe that we have constructed an instance
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where no matter how big N is, there does not exist any hyperplane with undesirability level at least
C + 1 (i.e., 2 in our example for C = 1) in either one of its halfspaces. This problematic instance
easily generalizes for any C > 1.
A.2 Supplementary Material for Section 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.14. We want to compute the probability that a point randomly sampled from
B(p⋆, ζ) falls in the following halfspace:
H′ ≡
{
x : 〈h⋆,x− p⋆〉 ≥ ζ · ln(3/2)√
d− 1
}
Hence, we want to bound the following probability: P [x ∈ H′|x ∈ B(p⋆, ζ)]. If we normalize B(p⋆, ζ)
to be the unit ball B, then this probability is equal to:
P
[
x ∈ H′|x ∈ B(p⋆, ζ)] = P [x ∈ H1|x ∈ B] = vol (B⋂H1)
vol(B)
(12)
where H1 is the halfspace such that H1 ≡
{
x : 〈h⋆,x〉 ≥ ln(3/2)√
d−1 = ρ
}
, and the last equality is due
to the fact that we are sampling uniformly at random.
Similar to the steps in [BHK16, Section 2.4.2], in order to compute vol
(
B
⋂
H1
)
we integrate
the incremental volume of a disk with width dx1, with its face being a (d − 1)-dimensional ball of
radius
√
1− x21. Let V (d − 1) denote the volume of the (d − 1)-dimensional unit ball. Then, the
surface area of the aforementioned disk is: (1− x21)
d−1
2 · V (d− 1).
vol
(
B
⋂
H1
)
=
∫ 1
ρ
(1− x21)
d−1
2 · V (d− 1)dx1 = V (d− 1) ·
∫ 1
ρ
(1− x21)
d−1
2 dx1
(V (d− 1) is a constant)
≥ V (d− 1) ·
∫ √ ln 2
d−1
ρ
(1− x21)
d−1
2 dx1 (
√
ln 2
d−1 < 1,∀d ≥ 2)
≥ V (d− 1) ·
∫ √ ln 2
d−1
ρ
(
e−2x
2
1
) d−1
2
dx1
(1− x2 ≥ e−2x2 , x ∈ [0, 0.8], ln 2d−1 ≤ 0.8,∀d ≥ 2)
= V (d− 1) ·
∫ √ ln 2
d−1
ρ
e−x
2
1
(d−1)dx1
≥ V (d− 1) ·
∫ √ ln 2
d−1
ρ
√
d− 1
ln 2
· x1 · e−x21(d−1)dx1 (x1 ≤
√
ln 2
d−1 )
≥ − V (d− 1)
2
√
(d− 1) · ln 2
[
e−(d−1)x
2
]√ ln 2
d−1
ρ
=
V (d− 1)
2
√
(d− 1) · ln 2
(
e− ln(3/2) − e− ln 2
)
=
V (d− 1)
2
√
(d− 1) · ln 2
(
2
3
− 1
2
)
=
V (d− 1)
12
√
(d− 1) · ln 2 (13)
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Next we show how to upper bound the volume of the unit ball B. First we compute the volume of one
of the ball’s hemispheres, denoted be vol(H). Then, the volume of the ball is vol(B) = 2vol(H).
The volume of a hemisphere is at most the volume of a cylinder of height 1 and radius 1, i.e.,
V (d− 1) · 1. Hence, vol(B) ≤ 2V (d− 1). Combining this with Equation (13), Equation (12) gives
the following ratio:
vol
(
B
⋂
H1
)
vol(B)
≥ 1
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√
(d− 1) · ln 2 ≥
1
20
√
d− 1 .
This concludes our proof.
A.3 Supplementary material for Section 3.4
Lemma A.4 (Grünbaum Theorem). Let K denote a convex body and κ its centroid. Given an
arbitrary non-zero vector u, let K+ = {x|〈u,x − κ〉 ≥ 0}. Then:
1
e
vol(K) ≤ vol (K+) ≤
(
1− 1
e
)
vol(K)
Lemma A.5 (Brunn’s Theorem). For convex set K if g(x) is the (d − 1)-dimensional volume of
the section K
⋂{y|〈y, ei〉 = x}, then the function r(x) = g(x) 1d−1 is concave in x over its support.
Proof of Lemma 3.17. For this proof we assume without loss of generality that u = e1, and that
the projection of K onto e1 is interval [a, 1]. We are interested in comparing the following two
quantities: vol(K) and vol(Kµ+). By definition:
vol (K+) =
∫ 1
0
r(x)d−1dx and vol
(
Kµ+
)
=
∫ 1
µ
r(x)d−1dx (14)
where r(x) = g(x)
1
d−1 and g(x) corresponds to the volume of the (d− 1)-dimensional section Kx =
K
⋂{x|〈x, ei〉 = x}. We now prove that vol(Kµ+) ≥ 1evol(K+). Combining this with Grünbaum
Theorem (Lemma A.4) gives the result. We denote by ρ the following ratio:
ρ =
∫ 1
µ r(x)
d−1dx∫ 1
0 r(x)
d−1dx
≥
∫ 1
1/d r(x)
d−1dx∫ 1
0 r(x)
d−1dx
(15)
We approximate function r(x) with function r˜:
r˜(x) =
{
r(x) if 0 ≤ x ≤ δ
(1− x) · r(δ)1−δ if δ < x ≤ 1
Note that since 0 = r˜(1) ≤ r(1) (because r(x) is a non-negative function) and r(x) is concave from
Brunn’s theorem (Lemma A.5), for functions r(x) and r˜(x) it holds that r(x) ≥ r˜(x). Using this
approximation function r˜(x) along with the fact that function f(z) = zy+z is increasing for any
scalar y > 0, we can relax Equation (15) as follows:
ρ ≥
∫ 1
1/d r˜(x)
d−1dx∫ 1/d
0 r˜(x)
d−1dx+
∫ 1
1/d r˜(x)
d−1dx
(16)
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Next, we use another approximation function rˆ(x) = (1− x) · r(δ)1−δ , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1; this time in order to
approximate function r˜(x). For x ∈ [δ, 1]: r˜(x) = rˆ(x). For x ∈ [0, δ] and since r˜(0) = r(0) = 0 and
r˜(x) is concave in x ∈ [0, δ], rˆ(x) ≥ r˜(x) = r(x), x ∈ [0, δ]. Hence, Equation (16) can be relaxed to:
ρ ≥
∫ 1
1/d rˆ(x)
d−1dx∫ 1/d
0 rˆ(x)
d−1dx+
∫ 1
1/d rˆ(x)
d−1dx
=
∫ 1
1/d(1− x)d−1 ·
(
r(δ)
1−δ
)d−1
dx∫ 1
0 (1− x)d−1 ·
(
r(δ)
1−δ
)d−1
dx
=
∫ 1
1/d(1− x)d−1dx∫ 1
0 (1− x)d−1dx
=
−1d
(
0− (1− 1d)d)
−1d (0− 1)
=
(
1− 1
d
)d
≥ 1
2e
This concludes our proof.
B Supplementary material for Section 5
B.1 Stackelberg Security Games
B.1.1 Offline-to-Online Algorithm
ALGORITHM 5: OfflineToOnline(Alg)
1 Let Alg be the algorithm that identifies the learner’s optimal p⋆ with O(s) samples.
2 for 1 ≤ t ≤ s do Learner commits to p⋆t suggested by Alg. ⊲ exploration phase
3 for s+ 1 ≤ t ≤ T do Learner commits to p⋆. ⊲ exploitation phase
Regarding the regret guarantee, we note that for all the exploration rounds the learner suffers
a regret of at most 1, while for the exploitation rounds, if p⋆ has been identified correctly, the
regret is 0. The latter happens with probability at least 1− δ and hence, the regret of incurred by
the exploitation rounds is at most δT . As a result, tuning δ = 1/T , from [PSTZ19] combined with
Algorithm 5 we get an upper bound of O˜ (d3) for the regret of the learner, where the O˜(·) notation
hides dependencies in the representation precision.
B.1.2 Missing Details
ALGORITHM 6: SeparateSearch ([PSTZ19])
1 Ui = P = [0, 1]d, i ∈ [d] ⊲ upper bound of the polytopes
2 Li = ∅, i ∈ [d] ⊲ lower bound of the polytopes
3 F = ∅ ⊲ effective actions set
4 Randomly choose a probability distribution θ from P .
5 Observe opponent’s response rˆ(θ) ∈ [d] and F ← {rˆ(θ)}.
6 while ∃Ui 6= Li and
⋃
i∈[d] Li 6= P do
7 while ∃i, j ∈ [d] such that Ui ∩ Uj 6= ∅ and i, j ∈ F do FindSeparatingPlane(Ui,Uj ,Li,Lj)
8 if ∃Ui 6= Li and i ∈ F then SecuritySearch(Ui,Li)
9 return L1, . . . ,Ld
Fix target i ∈ [d]. If there exists a coverage probability distribution such that target j is attacked by
the opponent, then we call target j an effective action for the opponent. For each identified effective
action i ∈ [d], the learner maintains an upper and a lower bound on the size of Pi. The estimated
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size shrinks as new separating hyperplanes between actions are identified. Interestingly, a module of
the algorithm of [PSTZ19] (called SeparateSearch) makes sure that given two different effective
actions j, k with overlapping bounds, then the module either finds their separating hyperplane, or a
new effective action. For completeness, we include the SeparateSearch Algorithm for the learner
above. Let Pi the polytope that corresponds to target i being attacked. The learner’s target thus
becomes to precisely find the frontiers of these polytopes.
ALGORITHM 7: SecuritySearch(Ui,Li) ([PSTZ19])
1 Find θ = (θ1, . . . , θd) such that θ ∈ Ui and max θi.
2 ∀j ∈ [d] set θt ← θj if j ∈ F and θt ← 0 otherwise.
3 Learner commits to θt and observes the opponent’s response: rˆ (θt).
4 if r (θt) = i then Li ← Ui
5 else Lrˆ(θt) ← θt and F ← F
⋃ {rˆ (θt)}.
We also include a sketch of the FindSeparatingHyperplane Algorithm of [LCM09], which is
called by SeparateSearch.
ALGORITHM 8: FindSeparatingHyperplane(Ui,Uj ,Li,Lj) ([LCM09])
1 Form Pi,Pj .
2 Find any point q ∈ Pi ∩ Pj .
3 Query q and observe that opponents response rˆ(q).
4 Draw line between q and some θ such that rˆ(θ) 6= rˆ(q), rˆ(θ) ∈ {i, j}.
5 Binary search on this line to find a single point on a hyperplane that you have not yet discovered, h.
6 Find set of d linearly independent points on h (i.e., reconstruct it).
7 Update Prˆ(θ) to include h.
Observe that Algorithm SeparateSearch is prone to being manipulated by irrational responses
from the opponent essentially when it observes the opponent’s response and it has to decide whether
the target should be added in the effective actions set or not. At a high level, the learner would
be robust against irrational replies from the opponent, if she had a way to guarantee that she has
observed a truly effective action. Here is how our solution with the undesirability levels can be
proven useful for this task: every time that the opponent attacks a specific target i, increase its
undesirability level by 1, but do not make it part of the effective action set yet. After 2C+1 rounds,
the learner’s best-response is the target i with u(i) ≥ C+1, since the learner has only C corruptions
available.
For the case of Algorithm 8 this is even more straightforward, as it actually includes a single
dimensional binary search as a subroutine, which we showed in Section 3 that it can be robustified
by asking the same query 2C + 1 times. Putting all these pieces together, we get the following.
B.2 Algorithm CorPV.K for Lipschitz buyers.
As pointed out earlier, our algorithm uses a lot of insights from the algorithm of Mao et al.
[MPLS18].
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ALGORITHM 9: CorPV.K for Lipschitz Buyers
1 for t ∈ [T ] do
2 Learner observes context xt ∈ [0, 1]d chosen by the opponent.
3 Learner finds j s.t., xt ∈ Xj. Let ℓj = diam(Xj). ⊲ [MPLS18, Algorithm 3, Step 6]
4 Learner guesses yt = (max(Yj) + min(Yj))/2 ⊲ [MPLS18, Algorithm 3, Step 7]
5 if yt > f(xt) then Increase undesirability of interval Yj \ [0, yt + Lℓj] by one.
6 else Increase undesirability of interval Yj \ [yt − Lℓj, 1] by one.
7 if interval Xj has been queried at least 2C + 1 times then
8 Update Yj to not include the interval that was undesirable at least C + 1 times.
9 if hj = length(Yj) < 4Lℓj then ⊲ [MPLS18, Algorithm 3, Steps 13–15]
10 Bisect each side of Xj to form 2
d new boxes with the same Yj .
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